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2 THE EURO AREA CRISIS
The global crisis that began to break as from summer 2007 and which ultimately evolved into 
a sovereign debt and balance of payments crisis in much of the euro area has revealed the 
limitations of the institutional design and governance of EMU agreed at the time of its incep-
tion. Last year, this common European project was subjected to an unprecedented degree of 
tension and the European authorities responded by designing a roadmap for the far-reaching 
renewal of the institutional arrangements underpinning EMU and its governance.
At the time EMU was instituted, the Member State economies did not meet the require-
ments to form what is known in the literature as an optimal monetary area, but there was 
confidence that the very functioning of the union would ultimately generate the incentives 
to move in that direction. The economic governance of EMU was underpinned by the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, under which the ultimate responsibility for preventing and, where ap-
propriate, correcting any domestic economic imbalance lay with the authorities of the 
country concerned. Fiscal policy and, generally, supply-side policies thus remained in the 
hands of each Member State, with coordination or monitoring mechanisms at area level 
proving rather limited. The design assumed that there would be continuity to the momen-
tum that had enabled the economies of the founding members to meet entry requirements, 
paving the way for deeper and more satisfactory convergence. The proper management of 
the non-monetary economic policies of each Member State would thereby replace the 
interest rate and the exchange rate as the main tool of macroeconomic stabilisation.
This original framework, which ruled out the possibility of the bail-out of a Member State 
by the area as a whole (in keeping with the related clause in the Treaty), was also under-
pinned by confidence that the efficient functioning of financial markets would be capable 
of suitably calibrating the risks of instability of each national economy. Interaction between 
the institutional design and market actions would reward the policies most firmly geared to 
ensuring stability and growth, and would penalise behaviour incompatible with member-
ship of a monetary union, providing for the early correction of imbalances that might 
emerge.
The creation of the monetary union fuelled expectations of higher potential growth across 
the area and, most particularly, in those economies starting from lower per capita income 
levels. In turn, the disappearance of exchange-rate risk and growing financial integration 
provided for the capital flows that would fund the move in that direction. Nonetheless, 
current-account imbalances and divergences in international investment positions among 
the member countries built up, rising to very high levels.
The scope and potential consequences of these dynamics were not correctly diagnosed. 
Far from persevering with the stabilising efforts that had allowed them to join the euro area 
from the outset, some national governments did not pursue the fiscal policies and struc-
tural reforms needed to curb the destabilising risks associated with very lax financing 
conditions. These were conducive first, to excessive dependence on external funding; 
further, to an allocation of resources that did not always prioritise their most efficient use; 
and finally, to growth expectations that could hardly be met without such policies.
All these developments unfolded against a global background of underpriced risk and of 
complex and relatively opaque financial innovations, in which international investors also 
1 Introduction
It was expected in the original 
design of EMU that the use of 
stability-oriented national 
economic policies and the 
disciplining capacity of the 
financial markets would 
ensure the continuity of the 
convergence process
However, neither national 
economic policies nor the 
financial markets played the 
stabilising role expected
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failed to play the moderating role expected of them and, in short, allowed funds to flow 
generously and without sufficient discrimination in terms of the risk inherent in the various 
investment projects. The absence of macroprudential financial regulatory and supervisory 
mechanisms further hampered the early detection of these excesses.
The US subprime mortgage market crisis from mid-2007 and, above all, the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 triggered a far-reaching process of financial risk 
re-pricing. The global recession accompanying the financial crisis significantly, though 
unevenly, affected the euro area economies and detracted from the asset quality of its 
banks. The public programmes of aid to the financial system, including nationalisations 
such as that of the Anglo Irish Bank in Ireland in early 2009, soon revealed that the ten-
sions in banking systems would have considerable repercussions on the public finances 
of the countries concerned. These effects would compound those arising from the fiscal 
policy response to the crisis (by means both of the automatic fiscal stabilisers and of the 
discretionary spending measures which, in the early stages of the crisis, increased budg-
et deficits).1
Growing asymmetry thus arose among the euro area economies. Private-sector over-
indebtedness, banking system vulnerabilities, public finances sustainability problems, ex-
cessive dependence on external saving, losses in competitiveness and a poor growth 
outlook affected several of the Member States to differing degrees and tended, moreover, 
to fuel one another in a contagious feedback loop, generating destabilising spirals.2 The 
firms, households, general government sectors and financial intermediaries of the coun-
tries with surplus saving were able to continue funding themselves under relatively advan-
tageous conditions, better even than during the upturn, while those located in countries 
with high external deficits had to withstand a notable reduction in the supply of financial 
resources and high increases in their funding costs (see Chart 2.1).3 The euro area was 
subjected to fragmentation incompatible with the integration proper to a monetary union, 
which inevitably posed credibility problems for the overall European project.
The euro area was lacking the wherewithal to face a situation such as that described. The 
design agreed in the Maastricht Treaty did not envisage mechanisms to implement a coor-
dinated and joint response by the national authorities to the imbalances and nor did it in-
clude common crisis-management instruments to alleviate the consequences. In the short 
run, while such mechanisms and instruments have taken shape, the ECB has provided 
what has proven crucial support to ensure the irreversibly of the euro, giving the authorities 
entrusted with their development the time needed to design and apply the changes that 
the situation requires.
The crisis has evidenced the pressing need for resolute progress towards a euro area that 
is more complete than that designed in the late 1990s, and one that is equipped with new 
and better instruments for economic stabilisation and crisis-prevention and resolution. To 
tackle the cracks that have emerged, the new institutional design should reconsider the 
tools for fiscal control and coordination among the member countries, incorporating com-
mon financial system supervision mechanisms and sharing more closely the management 
of the main risks. Along with this, new instruments will be needed to promote convergence 
The outbreak of the crisis 
exposed the shortcomings of 
these institutional 
arrangements
The crisis has necessitated 
specific measures to address 
the most extreme tensions, 
but it requires, above all, a 
far-reaching review of the 
institutional framework and 
the governance of the area
1  For a description of the events that have marked the euro area crisis, see P. Lane (2012), “The European Sover-
eign Debt Crisis”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 49-68.
2  See J.C. Shambaugh (2012), “The Euro’s Three Crises”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, spring.
3  See M. Bruche and J. Suárez (2009), The Macroeconomics of Money Market Freezes, CEPR Discussion Paper 
no. 704.
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among the member countries, to prevent competitive mismatches and to properly mutual-
ise the consequences of potential future shocks. Pivotal to all these reforms will be pro-
gress in transparency and democratic legitimacy to ensure the credibility of the new insti-
tutional framework and compliance with the agreements reached.
Considerable steps have already been taken along these lines, but the challenges ahead 
remain significant. This chapter reviews in detail the reasons why the global crisis has had 
such a differentiated and singular impact on the euro area; it discusses the main progress 
made in redesigning the euro; and it reviews the major challenges ahead for the area to 
restore the successful path of convergence that characterised its early years of existence.4
During the first eight years of the euro area, an increase in convergence across the mem-
ber countries’ per capita income was recorded, along with greater economic and financial 
flows within the area. Notwithstanding, the convergence attained was still incomplete and 
the situation in the member countries was still fairly uneven in terms of competitiveness, 
2  The impact of the crisis 
on the euro area
SOURCES: ECB and Datastream.
a Capital movements rekect the stock of portfolio investment and other investment of the Balance of Payments, excluding the Central Bank. A positive (negative) 
jgure denotes capital inkows (outkows). 
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4  Conjunctural developments in macroeconomic imbalances in 2012 and monetary policy conduct that year are 
analysed in detail in chapter 4 of the Spanish version of the Annual Report.
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debt levels and unemployment rates. This heterogeneity was amplified by the crisis5 and 
ultimately became a key determinant of the serious tensions that arose and of the need to 
redesign the institutional framework and governance of the euro area.
The crisis has taken the form of a series of financial tensions, competitive mismatches, 
growth constraints and problems with sovereign debt that have affected with particular 
virulence the countries most dependent on external funding or those with the most sig-
nificant structural shortcomings, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. This 
asymmetrical impact can be explained in terms of three fundamental and closely interre-
lated factors: the imbalances built up during the expansion, the economic policies pursued 
both before and in response to the crisis, and the uneven pass-through of the shocks via 
the various domestic markets.
Following the creation of EMU, some of the member countries enjoyed a forceful reduc-
tion in the cost of financing and increased their foreign debt to unprecedented levels. 
The funds were essentially from other member countries with current account surpluses 
and moderate economic growth rates. And, as befits financial systems in which banks 
are so strongly rooted and prevalent, as are those of the euro area, these flows were 
intermediated by credit institutions. The latter, in turn, also benefited from lax funding 
conditions on wholesale international markets, prompted by low interest rates, the wide-
spread under-pricing of credit risk and ample facilities for the securitisation of loans ex-
tended (see Chart 2.2).
Capital flows from countries with excess saving towards those with a lower level of income 
and with scant resources are conducive, in principle, to economic convergence within the 
euro area. But for this to occur the funds must be channelled towards those activities with 
most potential for increasing the economy’s productive capacity. In the euro area, how-
ever, a sizeable portion of financial investment was earmarked for real estate activities, 
which ultimately fuelled unsustainable increases in the prices of these assets. In parallel, 
the recipient countries reallocated resources from the tradeable to the non-tradeable 
goods sector, prompting the build-up of high current-account deficits (see Chart 2.2). The 
subsequent dependence on external financing placed these economies in a position that 
proved particularly vulnerable to changes in financial conditions.
Following the nominal convergence phase to meet the EMU entry criteria, the differences 
in inflation rates across the member countries did not continue narrowing. With a common 
nominal interest rate, the countries with the highest inflation rates experienced lower real 
interest rates, which boosted consumption, investment and the demand for credit. The 
absence of structural reforms in these economies limited the responsiveness of supply to 
this boost in demand, thereby feeding back into the cross-country inflation differences. 
Nor was proper use made of fiscal policy to temper the strong expansion in demand. The 
generous financing conditions took the pressure off governments as regarded their spend-
ing policies, and the horizontal mechanisms for controlling public finances envisaged in 
the Stability and Growth Pact were inoperative.
Despite the real exchange rate appreciation in the countries with the highest inflation rates, 
the effects on consumption and investment arising from the cuts to real interest rates and 
2.1.  THE SOURCE AND THE 
UNEVEN IMPACT OF THE 
CRISIS ON THE EURO AREA 
COUNTRIES
The euro area countries faced 
the financial crisis from very 
different positions…
… partly because domestic 
economic policies did not 
contribute to preserving 
convergence within 
the euro area…
5  See A. Estrada, J. Galí and D. López-Salido (2013), Patterns of Convergence and Divergence in the Euro Area, 
working paper presented at the IMF Thirteenth J. Polak Annual Research Conference, November 2012.
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from real estate inflation proved to be very expansionary; accordingly, swollen external 
deficits built up which were generously financed by the easy conditions then prevailing.
The financial markets, given their known tendency to overreact, also contributed to fuelling 
and amplifying the imbalances. In the early years of EMU, they underestimated – like 
everybody else – default risk. In the particular case of the Member States’ sovereign debt, and 
despite the no-bail-out clause, they did not distinguish between different issuers, meaning 
that the risk premia associated with these instruments practically disappeared. During the 
crisis, this same tendency to overreact worked in the opposite direction, raising risk premia 
… and partly because the 
financial markets also failed to 
impose the discipline 
expected
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above what was attributable to the fundamentals of the economies concerned and seri-
ously jeopardising the very functioning of the euro area.6
The mismatches in competitiveness across the euro area countries widened owing to the 
differences in how wages and productivity trended. These differences were, in part, close-
ly related to the diversity in the institutional configuration of the labour and product mar-
kets, and in the time and manner in which these countries applied the structural reforms 
needed to add flexibility to their economic structures. At the onset of EMU, wage growth-
restraining labour reforms and productivity-boosting product market reforms were intro-
duced, to a greater extent, in the countries where demand-side pressures were less, and 
in particular in Germany, where the reduction in ULCs and the growth of exports were very 
high (see Chart 2.3). Conversely, in other member countries the reform momentum de-
manded by the EMU entry convergence requirements faltered and has only picked up, in 
part, following external pressures derived from the unfolding and the management of the 
sovereign debt crisis (see Box 2.1).
As a result, member countries’ productive structures diverged during the upturn and only 
the strong adjustment imposed by the crisis on certain sectors, such as real estate, has 
recently corrected – albeit only partially – this tendency. The disparity explains, at least in 
part, why the nature of the crisis has differed in each case and also why the dispersion of 
GDP growth rates across the euro area countries has been much more marked in the two 
recent recessions (2008 Q1-2009 Q2 and that which began in 2011 Q3) and in the muted 
recovery between both (2009 Q3-2011 Q2) than in the recessions and expansions re-
corded in previous periods.7
Debt levels within the euro area are also very different from one country to another. 
Household debt, which accounted in the area as a whole in 2007 for 95% of gross dis-
posable income, increased to 100% at the end of last year. At the start of the crisis, these 
ratios stood at 126% in Portugal, 130% in Spain, 205% in Ireland and 222% in the Neth-
The uneven progress in 
introducing structural reforms 
also contributed to amplifying 
divergences
As a result, developments in 
the productive structures of 
the member countries were 
uneven…
… as was too the course of 
private and public debt…
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6  See E. Alberola, L. Molina and Pedro del Río (2012), Boom-bust cycles, imbalances, and discipline in Europe. 
Documentos de Trabajo, no. 1220, Banco de España.
7  Also compounding this was the uneven impact on current- and capital-account balances of the growth of the 
emerging countries, the integration of the Central and Eastern European countries, and the nominal appreciation 
of the euro. See R. Chen, G. M. Milesi-Ferreti and T. Tressel (2013), “External imbalances in the euro zone”, 
Economic Policy (January), pp. 101-142.
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One of the requirements for a monetary union to function properly 
is that price and wage setting in member countries should be flex-
ible enough to accommodate asymmetrical shocks without them 
resulting in a high and lasting reduction in economic activity. Dur-
ing the transition process towards EMU, many of the countries 
aspiring to membership implemented product and factor market 
reforms to achieve this flexibility. Furthermore, there was the hope 
that euro area membership in itself would accelerate the reforms.
However, during the period 1999-2007 the intensity with which 
Member States addressed structural reforms was very mixed. This 
was partly attributable to the need for reforms being perceived 
with less urgency in times of economic growth. In fact, after EMU 
was launched, structural reforms were postponed in the majority 
of countries where they were needed most and have only been 
taken up again recently under the pressure of events. This is what 
the findings available in the literature indicate which, although they 
do not provide definitive conclusions, they have not found favour-
able evidence of the idea that EMU has favoured the reform pro-
cess, but rather the opposite.1
These papers usually employ indicators on competition and la-
bour regulations compiled from a systematisation of the poten-
BOX 2.1STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND EMU
SOURCE: OECD Indicators of Employment Protection.
a The countries in each group are as follows:
OECD-Non-Europe: Australia, United States, Canada and Japan.
Europe-Euro area 10: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal.
Europe-Non-euro area: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland.
Eastern Europe: Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Turkey.
b Employment protection is the degree of rigidity (on a scale of 1 to 6, from least to most rigid) of employment protection legislation.
c Excluding Turkey.
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1  For a description of how the labour market reform process has devel-
oped in Spain, see S. Bentolila, J. J. Dolado and J. F. Jimeno (2012), 
“Reforming an insider-outsider labor market: the Spanish experience”, 
IZA Journal of European Labor Studies 2012, 1:4 (December).
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BOX 2.1STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND EMU (cont’d)
tially most influential aspects in determining prices and wages.2 
Some of the most frequently used indicators are the OECD’s 
indicators on employment protection legislation and product 
market regulation and the ICTWSS’ indicators on trade union 
membership and collective bargaining from the Database on In-
stitutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts. Panels 1 and 2 show some of 
these indicators grouped for comparison purposes into four 
geographical areas.3
SOURCE: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database.
a The countries in each group are as follows:
 OECD-Non-Europe: Australia, United States, Canada and Japan.
 Europe-Euro area 10: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal.
 Europe-Non-euro area: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland.
 Eastern Europe: Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Turkey.
b Product market regulation is the degree of rigidity (on a scale of 0 to 6, from least to most rigid) of market protection legislation.
c Value of the indicator between 0 and 6, 0 being the least restrictive.
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2  Summarising the full complexity of competition and labour market regu-
lations in quantitative indicators comparable across countries and over 
time is not without problems. Furthermore, in the case of regulations on 
competition the differences that may exist within each country as a re-
sult of the intervention of regional governments or federal states are not 
always included. Nevertheless, these indicators provide useful informa-
tion on general trends and the main characteristics of national regula-
tions on labour, goods and services markets.
3  The collective bargaining indicators are defined as follows: Coordina-
tion: 5 = Centralised negotiations with the imposition of a nationwide 
agreement or wage guidelines established by the government. 4 = Mix-
ture of sector and nation-wide negotiations in which central organisa-
tions reach agreements which are not necessarily applicable to all indus-
tries or in which certain trade unions and employer associations set 
guidelines for the economy as a whole. 3 = Sector bargaining with lim-
ited participation of national organisations with the possibility of negoti-
ating at company-level. 2 = Mixture of sector and company-level nego-
tiations with scant application of sectoral agreements . 1 = Fragmented 
negotiations, mainly at company level.
    Level: 5 = National or central. 4 = National or central, with additional 
levels of sector and/or company. 3 = Sectoral. 2 = Sectoral, with addi-
tional level of company. 1 = Company.
BOX ?TÍTULO RECUADRO
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BOX 2.1STRUCTURAL REF RMS AND EMU (cont’d)
From the simple observation of these indicators robust conclusions 
cannot be obtained about the impact on EMU of the reform intensity 
of its Member States, given that the changes in the indicators are not 
very different from those seen either in the same countries prior to the 
onset of EMU or in countries which do not belong to that group that 
started out from similar situations. Consequently, it is necessary to 
turn to more elaborate analyses (multiple regression) in order to iden-
tify the possible differential factors. Noteworthy among the initial pa-
pers dedicated to testing the assumption of whether or not EMU has 
favoured structural reforms is that of Duval and Elmeskov (2005), who 
consider labour and product market reforms and find in general that 
the occurrence of economic crises, the incidence of high unemploy-
ment and a healthy fiscal position tend to give rise to the introduction 
of reforms, whereas belonging to a monetary union, perhaps, de-
creases reforming activity. They also find that reforms in the product 
market favour the introduction of labour market reforms and vice 
versa. A later paper by Høj et al. (2006) confirms that the occurrence 
of major crises is associated with more and better reforms, although, 
as regards employment protection and employee benefits, these 
usually occur to a greater extent in growth periods. More recently, 
Bertola (2010)4 has found that in euro area Member States, employ-
ment protection legislation has been relaxed more, there has been a 
larger reduction in taxation of labour and a relative increase in the 
unemployment benefit replacement rate5. Finally, other narrative ap-
proaches concluded that the boom reduced incentives for introduc-
ing new reforms, which not only caused a decline in economic growth 
but it also prolonged the credit boom and delayed economic policy 
responses to the crisis6.
The indicators shown – available to 2008 – do not yet reflect the 
impact of recent reforms, but the information from other sources 
suggests that the structural reform process of euro area econo-
mies seems to have quickened during the crisis,7 in particular in 
those countries which are more reliant on external financing and 
in certain specific areas such as collective bargaining and unem-
ployment benefit systems and pension and employment protec-
tion systems. However, differences between Member States as 
regards the regulation of product and labour markets continue to 
be very pronounced.
4  See G. Bertola (2010), “Labour markets in EMU: What has changed and 
what needs to change”, in M. Buti, S. Deroose, V. Gaspar and J. Nogue-
ira Martins (Eds.), The euro: the first decade, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, pp. 715-758, and G. Bertola and A. Lo Prete (2010), 
Whence Policy? Government Policies, Finance and Economic Integra-
tion, CEPR Working Paper No. 7820.
5  A common trend in euro area countries is the gradual replacement of 
employment protection (making external flexibility easier) by unem-
ployment protection (higher replacement rate of unemployment bene-
fits). In the goods and services markets, the reforming efforts centre on 
some specific sectors (such as network industries) and the removal of 
administrative barriers; conversely, hardly any far-reaching reforms of 
education systems, of innovation and of professional services have 
been seen.
6  See J. Fernández-Villaverde, L. Garicano and T. Santos (2013), Politi-
cal Credit Cycles: The Case of the Euro Zone, NBER Working Paper 
No. 18899.
7 OECD (2013), Going for growth, Paris.
erlands. And since then they have held relatively constant in Portugal (122% in 2012), 
Spain (123%) and Ireland (205%), and increased in the Netherlands (249%). The micro-
economic data available, drawn from the recently published Eurosystem Household Fi-
nance and Consumption Survey, likewise show high cross-country heterogeneity (see 
Chart 2.4).
The increase in non-financial corporations’ debt also arose with uneven intensity: while in 
2007 companies’ debt in the euro area on average was equivalent to 4.4 times their gross 
operating surplus, in some of the countries now subject to greater financial stress, that 
rate was notably higher (7.7 in Portugal, 4.9 in Ireland and 8 in Spain). At present, the euro 
area average for corporate debt is equivalent to 5.1 times the gross operating surplus (8.6 in 
Portugal, 6.8 in Ireland and 6 in Spain).
In terms of the public-sector rate of indebtedness, the increases during the crisis, arising 
both from the primary deficits built up and from the higher cost of debt financing and 
lower GDP growth, were particularly marked in the Southern European countries. The ex-
ceptions were Italy, whose point of departure was already a debt rate higher than 100%, 
and Ireland, where the biggest impact stemmed from the clean-up of the banking sector 
(see Chart 2.5).
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Sufficient price and wage flexibility, and high mobility of the factors of production are two 
of the characteristics proper to an optimal monetary area. During the expansion that fol-
lowed the creation of EMU, few labour reforms were introduced that succeeded in improv-
ing the institutional configuration of the labour market in those countries that had histori-
cally shown greater price and wage rigidity and limited labour mobility (see Box 2.1). 
Consequently, the crisis has had a very uneven impact on unemployment, with an increase 
from 2007 to 2012 of 3.8 pp in the euro area as a whole, but of 16.8 pp in Spain, 16 pp in 
Greece and 10.2 pp in Ireland.
These changes are the result of very different labour market performances, which are 
much more clearly manifest when flows in job creation (labour flows from inactivity and 
unemployment to employment), job destruction (labour flows from employment to unem-
ployment and inactivity) and labour market exits (flows from employment and unemploy-
ment to inactivity) are observed (see Chart 2.6).
… and, especially, the 
behaviour of labour markets
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The crisis has highlighted four basic areas in which the initial institutional design and gov-
ernance of the euro area have proven insufficiently sound: i) the identification and correc-
tion of macroeconomic imbalances; ii) the implementation of the agreed fiscal discipline 
principles; iii) the consequences of growing financial integration, and iv) the non-existence 
of common crisis-resolution mechanisms.
The main divergences in the euro area reflected, as explained, the build-up of macroeco-
nomic imbalances that would need, sooner or later, to be corrected. The countries with 
higher growth in external debt were, indeed, those which posted lower growth in produc-
tivity. This is contrary to what characterises a natural process of economic convergence 
within a common monetary zone, where the higher future growth of productivity in the 
country with the lowest income warrants its indebtedness against the country with the 
highest income while such convergence is coming about.8
The Maastricht Treaty laid down oversight procedures and corrective mechanisms for 
excessive budget deficits and public debt, although they were relatively inoperative, as 
2.2. THE LIMITATIONS OF EMU
The macroeconomic 
divergences between the euro 
countries may have serious 
consequences if not curbed 
in time
SOURCES:  Labour Force Survey (Eurostat) and Banco de España.
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8  See F. Giavazzi and L. Spaventa (2011), “Why the current account may matter in a monetary union: lessons from 
the financial crisis in the euro area”, in M. Beblavy, D. Cobham and L. Ódor (eds.), The Euro Area and the Finan-
cial Crisis, Cambridge University Press.
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discussed below. But other potential macroeconomic imbalances (e.g. unemployment 
and the current-account balance) were scarcely catered for.
One of the potential vulnerabilities of EMU which was identified early on is that derived 
from the incentive to pursue overly lax fiscal policies if it is expected that the other member 
countries will come to the rescue in times of need. To correct this, the Treaty set caps on 
budget deficits and public debt through the Stability and Growth Pact, which also envis-
aged fining the countries that exceeded these ceilings. The Treaty likewise warned mem-
bers that they should meet their debt obligations exclusively through their own resources.
However, during the 1999-2007 period, in a setting of growth and low funding costs, the 
fiscal imbalances of some of the euro area countries were masked by extraordinary reve-
nue, which was used to lower taxes or to increase public spending. This did not give rise 
to any warning by international agencies, which did not identify the underlying imbalances 
and their risks for debt sustainability. In other countries which did not benefit from this type 
of revenue, such as Germany and France, but which did exceed the deficit ceilings set 
under the Stability and Growth Pact, the procedures established were not applied with due 
diligence. Ultimately, this diminished the capacity of the Pact to redress situations of risk.
The strong dependence on extraordinary revenue, the increase in public spending during 
the first phase of the crisis, the expenses arising from the clean-up of the financial sector 
and the marked rise in financing costs all induced a rapid increase in budget deficits (see 
Chart 2.2). Indeed, the most vulnerable economies saw how the fiscal instruments for 
economic stabilisation lost their power precisely when it was most needed; accordingly, 
the capacity to use a countercyclical fiscal policy was much diminished. Growing funding 
difficulties were exacerbated when the necessary fiscal consolidation measures began to 
produce negative effects on economic activity in the short run. This has given rise to 
heated debate on the magnitude of the “fiscal multipliers” and the room for potential grad-
ualism in the reduction in public spending that is compatible with the least costly exit from 
the crisis (see Box 1.2). In any event, the funding difficulties that countries with severe 
fiscal problems are facing and uncertainty over the magnitude of these multipliers means 
more efficient forms of reducing public spending and increasing revenue must be found, 
amid the difficulties of a setting marked by low growth and the need for the deleveraging 
of both the public and private sectors.
In the initial design of EMU, the supervision and regulation (in some of its elements) of the 
financial system remained within the national realm, despite the expected increase in fi-
nancial integration in the area. The consequences were dramatically highlighted by the 
crisis, as governments had to individually assume the cost of cleaning up financial institu-
tions whose economic activity and repercussions went beyond national borders. This ulti-
mately created a “diabolical link” which has magnified the relationship between sovereign 
and banking risks, especially in those countries with lower growth potential and a higher 
rate of indebtedness.9
As the financial difficulties heightened, Greece (owing to its public debt sustainability 
problems), Ireland (the fiscal consequences of its bank bailout) and Portugal (mainly its 
weak growth potential) had to request financial assistance from their partners. During 
2012, Cyprus also formally requested a support programme and Spain agreed on a financial 
The fiscal disciplining 
mechanisms were not 
effective…
… as a result of which the 
fiscal room for manoeuvre in 
the face of the crisis was very 
rapidly exhausted
In this setting, neither the 
consequences of growing 
financial integration nor how 
to tackle bank crises had been 
foreseen
The resolution mechanisms for 
banking and sovereign debt 
crises have only been 
launched a posteriori
9  See A. Mody and D. Sandri (2012), “The euro zone crisis: how banks and sovereigns came to be joined at the 
hip”, Economic Policy (April), pp. 199-230.
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aid package for the recapitalisation of part of its banking sector. The mechanisms to imple-
ment the financial aid, which is subject to strict conditionality tailored to each case, were 
primarily formalised ad hoc (Greece) and, later, through the European Financial Stability 
Fund. Finally, March 2011 saw the approval of the creation of the European Stability Mech-
anism (ESM). This is a permanent financial crisis-resolution mechanism for the euro coun-
tries which began to function last September and will be fully operational from July 2013.
The actions of the ECB have helped mitigate in part the consequences of the aforemen-
tioned institutional weaknesses, both through the use of conventional tools and, above all, 
through the implementation of a broad set of unconventional measures. The generous li-
quidity-provision policy by means of fixed-rate tenders with full allotment, broader eligibil-
ity criteria for the collateral for lending operations and the extension to three years of its 
long-term refinancing operations are significant examples here. The actions by the ECB 
have, at different times, allowed tensions to be alleviated and have bought the necessary 
time so that measures in other areas may bear fruit. The efficient design of the ECB’s op-
erations made the taking of these decisions easier.10 The securities purchase programmes 
aimed at restoring the transmission mechanism and, most particularly, the announcement 
of the so-called “outright monetary transactions” also contributed substantially to lessen-
ing the risks of growing sovereign risk premia spirals associated with the increase in un-
certainty over the irreversibility of the euro. In any event, it is clear from the description of 
the sources of this crisis that resolving the underlying problems cannot be done by the 
instruments available to the monetary authority, meaning that their role cannot stand in for 
an improvement in the governance and institutional design of EMU.
To tackle the problems at the root of the crisis affecting the euro area, the member coun-
tries must pursue decisive and convincing measures. Governments have to accept that, in 
a monetary union, domestic policies must be unequivocally geared to increasing the ad-
justment capacity of their economies, raising productivity and ensuring macroeconomic 
stability. That requires headway in the consolidation of public finances and undertaking 
reforms that raise the potential growth and competitiveness of the member economies 
and provide, at the same time, the necessary flexibility within a monetary union to make 
good the lack of certain traditional stabilisation instruments, such as the interest rate, the 
exchange rate and also fiscal discretionality.
But that is not enough. Also needed are resolute area-wide measures. The realisation that 
the initial design of the monetary union was not sufficiently sound has made reform a vital 
prerequisite for restoring credibility in the continuity of the project.
Initially, the reform of the euro area’s institutional architecture focused on strengthening 
budgetary policy surveillance mechanisms, extending the oversight perimeter subse-
quently to the macroeconomic imbalances (see Table 2.1). The reform of micro and macro-
prudential policies was also launched, to redress the flaws that had allowed an excessive 
build-up of risk in most euro area banking systems.
A far-reaching review of the Stability and Growth Pact was conducted, laying down new 
spending and debt-reduction rules along with a more extensive and harsher set of sanc-
tioning mechanisms. Further, the European Commission was empowered to intervene in 
the design phase of national budgets (the two-pack rules). To improve the national anchoring 
The ECB has made up, in part, 
for these insufficiencies 
through the intensive use of its 
unconventional tools
3  The way forward in 
resolving the 
shortcomings of the 
euro area
The reform of governance 
began with the strengthening 
of economic policy 
surveillance instruments
The Stability and Growth Pact 
was revised, introducing the 
Fiscal Compact and the new 
Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure…
10  For a comparison of the responses by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the ECB to the financial crisis, 
see M. Lenza, H. Pill and L. Reichlin (2010), Monetary Policy in Exceptional Times, ECB Working Paper, 1253.
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of fiscal policies, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance was introduced, an 
inter-governmental pact known as the Fiscal Compact, which makes it obligatory to trans-
pose into national law, preferably the Constitution, the commitment to maintain a balanced 
budget throughout the cycle. And to prevent other-than-fiscal macroeconomic imbalances 
from emerging, the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure was set in place and the Euro 
Plus Agreement was signed, whereunder euro area governments undertake to set in place 
competitiveness-enhancing wage and structural reform policies.
At a relatively early stage, the governments also agreed on the reform of the financial su-
pervision framework in the European Union, with the creation of sectoral supervisory au-
thorities and, more prominently, of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the new 
body entrusted with macroprudential supervision. The main aim of the ESRB is to examine 
the financial system as a whole, ensuring that the growing interrelatedness and complex-
ity of operations does not result in systemic risks. The ESRB recommended that all Mem-
ber States establish national macroprudential authorities, in accordance with a series of 
core principles. The Banco de España has created a high-level working group, with the 
participation of the Treasury, to draw up specific proposals in this respect.
The development of these new surveillance mechanisms for domestic economic policies 
helped overcome the reluctance of some countries to set in place financial assistance mecha-
nisms for the countries experiencing difficulties in raising financing on the markets. The ten-
sions in reaching an agreement on how to channel the financial assistance to Greece high-
lighted the need for a permanent instrument, with defined rules of conduct providing for diligent 
action so as to avoid contagion to other economies. But the fear that this instrument might 
weaken the incentives to pursue more disciplined policies meant that the starting point was a 
minimum-based initial approach, which had to be rectified as the successive waves of finan-
cial tensions highlighted the need for much more powerful firewalls that would be flexible 
... and a new area monitoring 
systemic financial risks was 
opened up: macroprudential 
policy
Permanent financial 
assistance mechanisms for 
countries with market-access 
difficulties were also 
established
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact. In addition to the cap of 3% of GDP for the dejBHt and 
the commitment to converge by at least 0.5 pp of GDP (in structural terms) towards the medium-term 
objective, the following are introduced: ceilings on spending growth, a rule for debt reduction (1/20 per 
annum) and more extensive sanctions that could be applied at an earlier phase of the procedure; 
reverse voting rules are also introduced, whereby the Commission's recommendations are considered 
to be approved unless the Council voices its disagreement within a specijDd period.
Creation of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, for the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances. Drawing on a set of indicators (Alert Mechanism), it will be determined 
which countries have or risk having excessive imbalances. These countries would be subject to an 
"in-depth analysis", which will conclude with recommendations. If these recommendtions are not 
reiteratedly met, the procedure might conclude with the imposition of sanctions.
European Commission Regulation that grants it power to issue an opinion on national budgets before 
these are approved in Parliament and which recommends establishing independent national jscal 
councils. 
European Commission Regulation that introduces the enhanced monitoring procedure for countries 
that have applied for jnancial assistance or that evidence instabilities which may jeopardise the area's 
jnancial stability.   
Treaty on Stability, Convergence and Governance. Under the so-called "Fiscal Compact" it is obligatory 
to transpose to national law, preferably to the Constitution, the commitment to a balanced budget 
throughout the cycle and to introduce an automatic correction mechanism for potential slippage.
Euro-Plus Pact (inter-governmental agreement whereunder countries undertake to set specijB reform 
commitments to increase tax harmonisation, competitiveness and jnancial restructuring). 
Other inter-governmental mechanisms
First phase of the reform (six-pack)
Other elements of the reform (two-pack)
TABLE 2.1 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE REFORM: ECONOMIC POLICY MONITORING INSTRUMENTS 
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enough to tackle the specific obstacles of each situation. Following the reform of the Treaty on 
the functioning of the EU, the ESM – a permanent institution designed to channel financial as-
sistance to the euro area countries that require it, subject to strict conditionality – commenced 
operating on 27 September 2012. The ESM will be fully operational from summer this year.
The tensions experienced during 2012 reveal that strengthening the surveillance mecha-
nisms was, while necessary, in itself insufficient. The challenges for the integrity of the euro 
area do not arise only from the inflexibility of labour and product markets, the dispersion 
of financial regulation and supervision and the absence of fiscal discipline. Events last 
summer highlighted the fact that, in an imperfect monetary union, the member countries 
are vulnerable to self-fulfilling prophecies which may ultimately convert an economy’s li-
quidity problems into a confidence crisis that spreads rapidly to other countries in the area 
and which may jeopardise the very viability of the project.11
The rise in 2012 of so-called “redenomination risk”, associated with the possibility of the 
single currency breaking apart, made a qualitative leap in the reform of governance neces-
sary. In late June 2012, the Euro Area Heads of State and Government added a new dimen-
sion to the process and agreed to move towards a new Union envisaging the transfer within 
the area of a large share of credit institution-supervision and bank crisis-management respon-
sibilities (banking union); a system of incentives to promote structural reforms and greater 
policy coordination (economic union); sufficient fiscal capacity to help withstand shocks more 
of a domestic nature and to prevent them from spreading to the other countries (fiscal union); 
and mechanisms ensuring the democratic legitimacy of the entire process (political union).
Despite the strong interdependence and synergies between these four pillars, the process 
will evolve in different phases (see Table 2.2), although there is still much uncertainty about 
But these instruments were 
not sufficiently powerful to 
short-circuit the spirals of 
instability to which the euro 
area continued to be 
vulnerable
A move towards greater fiscal, 
economic and financial 
integration became necessary
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Short term
 (next 18 months)
Medium term
(18 months-5 years)
Long term
(over 5 years)
Banking union Single supervisory mechanism and single 
resolution mechanism
Full banking union in which, in 
keeping with initial proposals, 
there is scope for a common 
deposit guarantee fund
Fiscal union Fiscal capacity to soften 
asymmetrical shocks. Debt 
Redemption Fund. Pooled short-
term debt issues (eurobills). 
European Treasury.
Full jscal union, with the creation 
of a European Budget and the 
introduction of eurobonds
Economic union Full implementation of the European 
Semester, of the six-pack and rapid 
agreement on the two-pack. Creation  
of a convergence and competitiveness 
instrument (contractual reform 
commitments) 
Greater coordination of employment 
and tax policies
Greater coordination of economic 
policies
Political union Greater democratic legitimacy will be sought throughout the process, enhancing accountability to the European 
Parliament
TOWARDS A MORE COMPLETE EMU 
MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMISSION'S AND EUROPEAN COUNCIL'S PROPOSALS 
TABLE 2.2 
11  P. de Grauwe (2011), The governance of a fragile Eurozone, University of Louvain and CEPS.
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the scope of the proposals in several of these areas, particularly concerning the initiatives 
that entail a degree of mutualisation of risks. Even so, discussions have been set under 
way along with reflection about the architecture needed for the long-term stability of the 
euro area, and a roadmap has been laid down to move towards this new model.
While the design of this roadmap has allowed governments to reinforce their commitment 
to the continuity of the European project, it should not be forgotten that, in the short term, 
resolving the crisis also requires specific measures that help correct the imbalances that 
have led to it (legacy issues), alleviate adjustment costs and allow a growth path to be 
promptly resumed.
At the height of the crisis, the vulnerability that arises from the coexistence of a single mon-
etary policy with financial systems in which the ultimate responsibility for the supervision and 
resolution of banks falls on national governments became evident. In the analytical literature, 
this phenomenon is called a “financial trilemma”, under which maintaining the autonomy of 
national financial policies in the presence of a supranationally integrated financial system will 
ultimately generate instabilities that may degenerate into serious banking crises.12
The capacity of national governments to ensure financial stability within a monetary union 
is limited by the possibility of a perverse feedback dynamic arising between banking and 
sovereign risk. The capacity of financial supervision exercised at the national level is also 
limited when it comes to tackling the systemic consequences proper to an integrated fi-
nancial area and the coordination difficulties that arise in the case of banks with strong 
cross-border links, which may prolong the process and increase restructuring or resolution 
costs, as occurred with certain European groups.
The foregoing developments have forged a growing consensus about the need to progres-
sively transfer essential aspects of banking policy to the supranational level.13 To this end, 
the European governments agreed in June 2012 to move towards establishing a banking 
union, capable of rebuilding confidence in the soundness of the banking system, eliminat-
ing the fragmentation of markets and restoring the monetary policy transmission channels. 
Under the initial agreement reached, this union would be based on three essential pillars: 
a single supervisory mechanism, a management and resolution mechanism for banks in 
crisis and, finally, a common deposit guarantee fund.
In the face of the serious instability experienced in the summer of 2012 and the political 
difficulties of pushing through the other two pillars of the banking union owing to their 
potential fiscal implications, progress has been brisker in establishing the single supervi-
sory mechanism (SSM), which will foreseeably come into force during 2014. The SSM will 
comprise the national supervisory authorities and the ECB, which will be entrusted with 
directly supervising the biggest banks and those that have received European financial 
support. To avoid the conflict that may arise between the ECB’s monetary policy decisions 
and supervisory actions, functional barriers will be set in place within the institution; more 
specifically, through the creation of a new supervision board, whose decisions shall be 
considered as adopted provided that the Governing Council lodges no objection. The 
national supervisory authorities will, in any event, continue to play a significant role in the 
SSM, enabling their better knowledge of local markets to be harnessed.
In parallel, the absorption of 
the imbalances built up in the 
past must be tackled in the 
short term
3.1 BANKING UNION
Financial integration in a 
monetary union requires 
greater co-responsibility in 
supervision and in bank 
resolution…
… in order to prevent systemic 
risks and the feedback loop 
between sovereign and 
banking risk
In June 2012 it was agreed to 
move towards a banking union
Priority was granted in 
December to setting up a 
single supervisor, comprising 
the ECB and the national 
supervisors
12  D. Schoenmaker (2009), The Trilemma of Financial Stability, working paper 1340395, SSRN.
13  See T. Beck (ed.) (2012), Banking union for Europe: risks and challenges, VoxEU Book, and J. Pisani-Ferry, A. Sapir, 
N. Verón and G.B. Wolff (2012), What kind of European banking union?, Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/12.
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Achieving a genuine banking union involves not only centralising responsibility for the pru-
dential supervision of banks, but also setting in place an integrated restructuring and resolu-
tion mechanism for ailing banks, with sufficient fiscal capacity to isolate outbreaks of insta-
bility when prevention is not enough and banking crises arise.14 Only with this supranational 
approach can problems be addressed with the necessary speed, preventing the difficulties 
that may arise in certain banks from distorting the public finances of the States where they 
are located and from projecting mistrust about the entire financial system.
The proposals based on a greater coordination among the national authorities responsible 
for resolution, even when they envisage pre-set rules for the distribution of costs in the case 
of cross-border banks, are not powerful enough to eliminate the link between banking risk 
and sovereign risk.15 Mindful of this, a compromise was reached at the December 2012 
Summit of euro area Heads of State and Government to move ahead in the design of a new 
instrument during 2013, on the basis of a proposal to be drawn up by the European Com-
mission. Evidently, a mechanism of these characteristics involves pooling decisions with 
fiscal and political implications. But setting in place an incomplete banking union would 
have harmful effects for financial stability, as it would not only not eliminate the destabilising 
link between sovereign and banking risk, but it would also prompt strong institutional ten-
sions between the supranational body that decides which banks may or may not be viable 
and the States that would have to individually tackle their restructuring or resolution.
To minimise the risk of weakening the incentives to maintain prudent bank practices in the 
new setting of greater risk mutualisation, a clear regulatory framework is necessary. This 
will guarantee that any euro area bank is resolved following uniform criteria, which ensure 
that shareholders and private investors share losses and under the premise that any sup-
port will be recouped or indeed pre-financed by the private financial sector itself.16
The third pillar of the complete future banking union is the creation of a common deposit 
guarantee scheme, on which consensus has not yet been forged. Currently, various guar-
antee funds exist alongside one another in the euro area countries, and they are not per-
fectly harmonised, especially as regards how they are funded. The implicit support of the 
national Treasury should the accumulated funds prove insufficient in the event of system-
ic-like crises explains why this element is a significant link in the chain existing at present 
between sovereign risk and banking risk.
While the European directives under way will entail a greater harmonisation of these ar-
rangements, the estimates available on the costs of bank crises highlight the limitations a 
national fund may display in checking processes involving losses in confidence that may 
result in a massive withdrawal of deposits.17 Some proposals suggest establishing lending 
arrangements between the respective national firms, which would increase intervention 
power, although this might not be enough if the lack of confidence spread to a large num-
ber of countries. Another possibility is to create a supranational guarantee fund, which 
would exist alongside the current national funds and would only act when the fund of the 
country concerned had exhausted its resources.
The common management 
and resolution mechanism for 
banks in crisis will entail 
sharing sovereignty in 
exchange for a greater 
mutualisation of risks
Setting in place an integrated 
deposit guarantee scheme will 
also be tackled later
14  See, for example, D. Gross and D. Schoenmaker (2012), A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund, 
CEPS working paper no. 364.
15  C. Goodhart and D. Schoenmaker (2009), “Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises”, Interna-
tional Journal of Central Banking.
16  J. Pisani-Ferry and M. Wolf (2012), The fiscal implications of a banking union, Bruegel Policy Contribution 
2012/06.
17  L. Laeven and F. Valencia (2012), Systemic Banking Database: an update, working paper 12/163, International 
Monetary Fund.
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The design of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure responds to the need for early 
detection of imbalances that may jeopardise the stability of the euro area. Acknowledging 
that euro area members are not free from the risk of a balance of payments crisis18 advises 
the adoption of more proactive mechanisms that prevent imbalances emerging and bol-
ster the channels that allow for their adjustment. The Euro 2020 Strategy and its forerun-
ner, the Lisbon Agenda, have not so far managed to drive the reform processes that would 
have allowed the current shocks to be tackled with greater flexibility.
The euro area Heads of State and Government agreed to create the so-called “European 
Convergence and Competitiveness Mechanism”, whose main objective is to drive eco-
nomic reforms through entering into contractual commitments with financial incentives. 
What is involved here, in any event, is a complex instrument that ultimately resides on a 
contract between international and national institutions.
Alternatively or additionally, programmes funded exclusively by Community bodies could 
be developed and offered to member countries under the principle that such instruments 
would be available provided any institutional constraints that might detract from their ef-
fectiveness were eliminated. The re-routing of structural funds might be permitted, along 
with new contributions by the member countries to that end. Initiatives could focus on 
improving the working of labour markets which, as has been manifest throughout the cri-
sis, crucially determine each country’s response in the face of a shock.
There is also a need for more resolute progress towards eliminating the barriers still ham-
pering trade and the international provision of services, and towards greater tax harmoni-
sation to prevent distortions to business competition. 
As a complement to reinforcing national fiscal policy coordination and oversight instru-
ments, extending the capacity of the European budget to act as a stabiliser would help 
soften the economic impact of asymmetrical shocks. However, extending the size and 
functions of the European budget is a heavily controversial subject.
Firstly, there is no consensus on the ability of potential supranational fiscal stabilisers to 
absorb the impact of specific asymmetrical shocks across the euro area countries. Al-
though some empirical research points to the significance of this type of asymmetry as an 
explanatory factor of cyclical differences within the euro area19, it is not clear whether this 
instrument is suitable when divergences reflect differentiated responses to a common 
shock, as a consequence of national particularities whose origins lie, for example, in the 
poor functioning of the labour market.
Further, there is evidence that, in the United States and in other federal countries, it is fi-
nancial channels which soften a large portion of asymmetrical shocks, while the cushion-
ing role of fiscal transfers is less substantial, although significant.20 But it is not clear that 
the experience of these federations can be extrapolated to the euro area. The crisis has 
3.2 ECONOMIC UNION
The proper functioning of the 
euro area requires countries to 
set in place measures to 
prevent imbalances emerging 
and to increase the 
effectiveness of the 
adjustment mechanisms
The future European 
Convergence and 
Competitiveness Mechanism 
introduces contractual reform 
commitments with financial 
incentives…
… to which the Community-
designed and managed 
convergence instruments 
should be added…
… along with the full 
implementation of the 
Services Directive and tax 
harmonisation
3.3 FISCAL UNION
The need for a European 
budget arouses much 
controversy
18  S. Merler and J. Pisani-Ferry (2001), Sudden stops in the euro area, Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/06.
19  A Belke and D. Gross (1999), “Asymmetric shocks and EMU. Is there a need for a Stability Fund?”, Intereco-
nomics, 1998.
20  P. Asdrubali, B. E. Sorensen and O. Yosha (1996), “Channels of interstate risk sharing: United States (1963-
1990)”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, pp. 1081-1111. M. Hoffmann and B. E. Sorensen 
(2012), “Don’t expect too much from EZ fiscal union – and complete the unfinished integration of European 
capital markets!”, VoxEE, November.
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shown that the euro area is highly vulnerable to losses of confidence that can ultimately 
lead to the redeployment of foreign capital and the fragmentation of financial markets 
which, far from dampening the shocks, may exacerbate them. Progress towards a banking 
union will help mitigate the risks of fragmentation; but even so, the distribution of financial 
assets in Europe shows a greater national bias than in other federal states, without there 
being any evidence quantifying the factors explaining this.
The size of the common European budget might, in any event, be smaller than that of 
other federations, since it would not perform income redistribution functions other than 
those currently envisaged under the framework of convergence-promoting policies, and it 
would confine itself to stabilising or structural reform-boosting functions (in the case of the 
competitiveness and convergence mechanism, for instance). Nonetheless, some more 
ambitious proposals call also for greater capacity to face severe recessions affecting the 
euro area as a whole and to preserve financial stability, albeit while constantly maintaining 
financial equilibrium over the cycle to prevent permanent income transfers (see Box 2.2).21
To exercise this stabilising function, various options have been considered.22 These in-
clude most notably establishing an unemployment insurance tranche funded by the Euro-
pean budget or by a system of payments linked to changes in the output gap. Financing 
could be through direct government contributions or with funds from specific taxes.
A more advanced step in the fiscal union realm is the joint issuance of some type of pooled 
debt that helps mitigate the vulnerability of individual issues to losses of confidence such 
as those experienced during the crisis. In this respect, the possibility of the joint issuance 
of short-term debt instruments (Treasury bills), in a limited fashion and subject to strict con-
ditionality23, has been envisaged. Over a longer term, the European Commission and Coun-
cil have considered introducing eurobonds, although this initiative has met strong rejection 
in some countries owing to its potential risk of weakening the incentives to pursue disci-
plined fiscal policies. Accordingly, alternatives have been offered which seek to introduce 
additional disciplining elements [Delpla et al. (2010), Euronomics Group (2011)] that com-
plement the framework of rules derived from the recent reform of governance.24
Along with further progress towards greater economic, fiscal and financial integration, a 
high degree of corporation is also needed in the short term to eliminate the accumulated 
imbalances and to design strategies that provide for the restoring of confidence and eco-
nomic growth to smooth the transition towards the new euro area model.
In the fiscal arena, progress in the consolidation of public finances is proving notable in 
most countries. But the difficulties in reducing debt to more moderate levels, against a 
background of high sovereign debt funding costs and of sluggish economic growth, are 
evident. In this respect, proposals have been tabled, such as that originally made by the 
German Council of Economic Experts for the creation of a debt repayment fund, which 
The European budget, in any 
event, would not extend the 
income redistribution 
functions envisaged under the 
current framework and it 
would be smaller than that of 
other federations
The distribution of funds might 
be linked to unemployment or 
to the output gap
A fiscal union could be 
completed with the joint 
issuance of debt
3.4  THE NEED TO ABSORB THE 
IMBALANCES THAT HAVE 
BUILT UP
International cooperation is 
vital to address the resolution 
of legacy problems…
… firstly, providing for fiscal 
consolidation in the countries 
with bigger public finances 
imbalances…
21  G.B. Wolff (2012), A budget for Europe’s monetary union, Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22.
22  J. Pisani-Ferry, E. Vihriala and G.B. Wolff (2013), Options for a Euro Area fiscal capacity, Bruegel Policy Contri-
bution 2013/1.
23  Based on an original idea by C. Hellwig and T. Philippon (2011), “Eurobills, not Eurobonds”,, VoxEU, who pro-
pose a limit of 10% of GDP for all countries.
24  See J. Delpla and J. von Weizsacker (2010), The Blue Bond Proposal,Bruegel Policy Brief 420, and Euronomics 
Group (2011), European Safe Bonds(ESBies), The Euronomic-group.
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The literature on monetary unions indicates that the main channels 
for cushioning or sharing risk when a country in the union experi-
ences an asymmetrical shock are migratory flows, fiscal transfers 
and financial markets. When a country (or region) is subject to a 
shock, the consequences can be reduced if part of its population 
emigrates to other regions. The shock can also be cushioned by 
government intervention through fiscal transfers from the federal 
budget, as in the case of the United States (fiscal channel). Fur-
thermore, the fall in GDP does not necessarily have to feed through 
in full to residents’ income if capital ownership is diversified so that 
part of the productive capital of that economy is owned by non-
residents while, at the same time, residents obtain income from 
BOX 2.2RISK-SHARING MECHANISMS IN MONETARY UNIONS
SOURCES: ECB, Banco de España and other.
a Percentage held by residents in the country, in the euro area and outside the euro area.
b Estimated according to the methodolgy of Asdrubali et al. (1996).
c t-ratios in brackets. The system estimated is:
ƃ&#/tƃ&-/t = V1t + β1ƃ&#/t + ε1t
ƃ&-/tƃ--/t = V2t + β2ƃ&#/t + ε2t
ƃ--/tƃ--(t = V3t + β3ƃ&#/t + ε3t
ƃ--(tƃ"t = V4t + β4ƃ&#/t + ε4t
ƃ"t = V5t + β5ƃ&#/t + ε5t ,
VGDQD&#/HRFQNRRCNLDRSHBOQNCTBS&-/HRFQNRRM@SHNM@KOQNCTBS--/HRMDSM@SHNM@KOQNCTBS--(HRMDSM@SHNM@KHMBNLD@MC"HRSNS@KBNMRTLOSHNM KK
SGDU@QH@AKDR@QDDWOQDRRDCHMKNF@QHSGLR@MCSGDBNDEjBHDMSRβ1, β2, β3, β4@OOQNWHL@SDSGDRG@QDCQHRJSGQNTFGB@OHS@KL@QJDSRCDOQDBH@SHNMjRB@KSQ@MREDQR@MC
BQDCHSL@QJDSRQDRODBSHUDKX3GDBNDEjBHDMSβ5 measures the unshared risk.
d !$2QDMRDM@MC.8NRG@ŭ(MSDQM@SHNM@KQHRJRG@QHMF@MC$TQNOD@MLNMDS@QXTMHjB@SHNMŭJournal of International Economics, 45, pp. 211-238.
e P. Asdrubali, B. E. Sørensen and O. Yosha, "Channels of interstate risk sharing: United States (1963-1990)", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (4), pp. 
1081–1111.
f S. Basher, F. Bali and L. Rosmy (2009), Channels of risk sharing among Canadian provinces: 1961-2006.
g R. Heppe and J. von Hagen (2010), Interstate risk sharing in Germany, 1970-2006. University of Connecticut Working Paper 13.
EMU estimates EC-8 (d) United States (e) Canada (f) &ermany (g)
1970-2012 1999-2007 1999-2012 1966-1990 1963-1990 1961-2006 1995-2006
Capital markets -0.03 0.03 -0.09 0.00 0.39 0.26 0.51
(-1.76) (0.29) (-0.97) (1.00) (3.00) (7.15) (6.80)
#epreciation -0.10 0.00 -0.13 -0.04 -- -- --
(-6.23) (-0.20) (-3.38) (-2) -- -- --
Transfers 0.01 -0.11 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.11
(0.38) (-1.43) (1.01) (2.00) (1.00) (6.63) (1.58)
Credit channel 0.47 0.54 0.49 0.46 0.23 0.18 0.18
(7.84) (2.46) (4.23) (6.00) (6.00) (9.78) (3.13)
Unshared risk 0.64 0.54 0.63 0.57 0.25 0.30 0.21
(9.70) (6.06) (5.74) (6.00) (6.00) (4.07) (3.01)
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BOX 2.2RISK-SHARING MECHANISMS IN MONETARY UNIONS (cont’d)
other countries (regions) that are not affected by the shock — in 
this literature this channel is usually called “capital markets”. Fi-
nally, the households and firms of that economy can moderate 
their consumption by turning to the credit market (credit channel).
Several empirical papers have attempted to quantify the extent of 
risk-sharing which each of these channels can provide based on 
the experience of previously existing federal unions. The method-
ology usually employed is that proposed by Asdrubali et al. 
(1996),1 which endeavours to quantify to what degree the variance 
in a State’s gross domestic product is reflected in the variance in 
that State’s total consumption.2
As can be seen in the accompanying table, the evidence available 
for the United States and other federal States indicates that a 
large share of the shocks are cushioned by capital markets 
(around 40%). Credit markets also play an important role as a risk 
diversification channel (buffering around 20% of the shocks), 
whereas the impact of fiscal transfers tends to be more moderate, 
below 20%, but economically significant. Approximately 20-30% 
of the magnitude of the shocks is not shared or diversified in 
those States.
In the case of the euro area countries, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) 
show that the credit channel has been the only way to cushion 
shocks between EU countries, although some more recent pa-
pers3 suggest an increase in the strength of risk-sharing through 
the capital markets channel. A possible contributing factor here is 
that financial integration has reduced the national bias of busi-
ness ownership as seen in Panel 1, which presents the percent-
age of equities issued by euro area residents and acquired by 
national residents, residents of other euro area countries and 
those of third countries.
However, the strength of this channel is still comparatively very 
low. The accompanying table shows various estimates made for 
all the euro area countries with data available from 1970 to 2012 
(first column in the table), from the onset of EMU to 2012 (second 
column) and to the year before the outbreak of the crisis (third 
column). The findings show, firstly, that compared with other fed-
eral States the percentage of risk that is not shared or mutualised 
(last line of the table) is much higher in the euro area, and that is 
due both to the absence of fiscal transfers and the lower strength 
of risk sharing through capital markets in the euro area. The justi-
fication of the latter may lie, on one hand, in the persisting greater 
national bias of investments compared with other monetary un-
ions and, on the other, in the existence of a more asymmetrical 
distribution of ownership since only a few countries concentrate 
most of the cross-border investments (within the euro area itself)4. 
Secondly, the credit channel is the only buffer within EMU, which 
confirms the previous evidence obtained by Sørensen and Yosha 
(1998). However, the strength of this channel seems to have waned 
during the crisis years. As seen in Panel 2 and in the accompany-
ing table, the estimated regressions seem to indicate an increase 
of the amount of “unshared” risk during the crisis years.
Several authors underline how, in the case of the United States, 
the banking crises of certain States were handled and resolved 
more swiftly and with lower losses by a federal institution, the 
FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) without jeopardis-
ing the stability of the whole.5 By contrast, in EMU the absence of 
a banking union with crisis management institutions that have suf-
ficient fiscal backing left it exposed to the loss of confidence that 
ultimately fragmented financial markets with the result that they 
decreased their shock stabilising role.
In conclusion, EMU does not have the adjustment channels exist-
ing in other unions of federal States and its main channel, the 
credit one, may lose strength when there is a loss of confidence 
such as that experienced during the current crisis. The develop-
ment of a full banking union with crisis management instruments 
that avoid the fragmentation of financial markets, is pivotal for the 
stability of the European project. Also, to supplement this, it would 
be appropriate to increase the strength of the fiscal channel which 
is currently non-existent, by designing a European budget for sta-
bilising purposes.
4  H. Zemanek (2010), Asymmetric International risk sharing in the Euro 
Area, Institute for Economic Policy, Germany.
5  D. Gross (2012), “Banking Union: If Ireland were Nevada”, VoxEU, and 
M. Hoffmann and B. E. Sørensen (2012), “Don’t expect too much from 
EZ fiscal union – and complete the unfinished integration of European 
capital markets!”, VoxEU.
1  P. Asdrubali, B. Sørensen and O. Yosha (1996), “Channels of interstate 
risk sharing: United States (1963-1990)”, The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, November, pp. 1081-1111.
2  In order to quantify the stabilising effect of these channels a regression 
analysis is used between GDP and GNP (GDP less income from labour 
and net investment from the rest of the world), income available for con-
sumption before and after taxes and total consumption, plus the depre-
ciation of an economy’s assets in order to take into account the differ-
ence existing in national accounts between gross and net domestic 
product. Although this analysis does not permit consideration of the 
possible stabilising effect of migratory flows (beyond the effects which 
may arise from migrants’ remittances), in the specific case of EMU this 
channel was not relevant.
3  B. E. Sørensen and O. Yosha (1998), “International risk sharing and 
European monetary unification”, Journal of International Economics, 
45, pp. 211-238. D. Giannone and L. Reichlin (2006), Trends and cycles 
in the euro area, ECB Working Paper 595. Y. Demyanyk, C. Østergaard 
and B. E. Sørensen (2008), Risk sharing and portfolio allocation in 
EMU, European Economy Policy Paper 334. For an analysis of the risk 
mutualisation mechanisms across Spanish regions, see E. Alberola 
and P. Asdrubali (1997), How do countries smooth regional disturbanc-
es? Risk sharing in Spain: 1973-1993, Documentos de Trabajo, No. 
9724, Banco de España.
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merit in-depth analysis.25 This specific proposal involves the creation of a fund (European 
Redemption Fund) of limited duration and amount, which during its early years of opera-
tion would progressively assume the debt maturities of each country that exceed 60% of 
GDP, refinancing them through pooled issues (which would bear notably lower interest 
rates than those most countries currently face). In exchange, strict conditionality would be 
demanded, in the form of specific commitment to fiscal consolidation and structural re-
form. In the following years, the fund would progressively redeem its debt issues, by 
means of the contributions previously made by each country.
The underlying problems in the banking system hampering the normalisation of financial 
conditions must also be addressed. The possibility that the ESM may directly recapitalise 
ailing banks, acting as a bridge towards the future management and resolution mechanism, 
would contribute to restoring confidence in the banking system, facilitating the return to 
funding markets that must be faced by countries that have received financial support.
It will in any event be necessary to apply growth-promoting policies that enable the high 
levels of unemployment built up during the crisis to be reabsorbed. Initiatives such as the 
Pact for Growth that have been pursued to date have proven clearly insufficient. The cor-
rection of competitive mismatches would also be made easier by measures that were to 
re-balance aggregate demand within the euro area, with bigger increases in domestic 
demand in those countries running current-account surpluses and a healthier internation-
al external position, and bigger increases in external demand in the others.
Progress towards a more complete union will have to be made at what is a complicated 
time for the European project, with surveys revealing a growing lack of confidence among 
citizens. Accordingly, the process will have to be accompanied by transparency and the 
setting in place of accountability mechanisms at the appropriate level so as to allow citi-
zens’ confidence in the euro to be restored.
... the direct recapitalisation of 
European banks…
… and, in short, eliminating 
any type of drag on growth…
… in an environment based on 
transparency and 
accountability
25  The European Redemption Pact: An illustrative guide, German Council of Economic Experts, and C. M. Schmidt 
and B. Weigert (2013), Weathering the crisis and beyond: Perspectives for the euro area, CEPR Working Paper 
9414.
